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Abstract
There is a perception that engineers experience challenges
in areas such as communication, conflict resolution, and
leadership. Defensive routines are actions implemented as
a result of being in an embarrassing or threatening situa‐
tion. This research uses a case study approach to measure
whether defensive routines are more common in engineer‐
ing managers or non-engineering managers. Twenty-seven
managers created case studies based on their unique
experiences as managers. These case studies were scored,
and the results of this research indicate that engineering
managers employ defensive routines more commonly than
non-engineering managers.
Keywords Defensive Routines, Engineering Managers,
Model I Behaviour, Model II Behaviour

1. Introduction
Successful engineering managers are able to work in
technology-based organizations with rapid production
cycles [1]. Corporations consider success as delivering a
quality product ahead of schedule and/or below cost,

leading a team to be as efficient as they can, and motivating
the team to reach their highest potential. Research indicates
that to be an effective manager, communication and trust
are key indicators that should be present [1, 2]. In addition,
other skills such as leadership, collaboration, and active
learning [1] are needed to be an effective manager.
There is considerable research on engineers and their
behaviours, but there is a need for research that focuses on
developing engineers to assume leadership roles in
technology-based organizations [1]. It can be difficult for
an engineering student to transition to being a working
engineer or an engineer managing large projects and/or
individuals. Much of the research supports that the
engineering education has a direct effect on how engineers
operate in the working environment. Some engineers
believe that engineering education prepares them to take
the data provided to them and calculate answers from the
information [2]. However, universities are criticized for
producing technically competent students, but not training
them for the real world work environment [1]. In addition,
when individuals are commonly rewarded for superior
work, they may start to act defensively to save face when
their work is considered average or less than superior.
Research has shown that effort is needed to integrate recent
Int J Eng Bus Manag, 2015, 7:8 | doi: 10.5772/60114
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engineering graduates into the work environment through
socialization. This method allows new engineers to learn
their roles, attain knowledge of job skills, and assimilate
into the organization [3]. Furthermore, some believe that
engineers move into management because the technical
path is truncated once a certain level is achieved [3].
Research suggests that there are certain leadership skills
needed to be productive and successful in these different
phases such as communication, leadership, collaboration,
and active learning [1].
Defensive routines are defined as ‘actions or policies that
prevent individuals from experiencing embarrassment or
threat’ [4]. According to Argyris [5], defensive routines are
developed early in life, as early as 12 years old. Behaviours
defined as defensive routines may vary; however, the
approach is using these behaviours consistently [5].
Defensive routines are a result of ‘Model I’ behaviour,
which is based on the desire to win and minimize negative
feelings, while ‘Model II’ behaviour focuses on seeking
valid information through inquiry and making an in‐
formed choice regardless of who wins or loses [6]. This
research investigates whether engineering managers
exhibit defensive routines more than non-engineering
managers.
2. Literature review
The literature review is divided into four sections. Organ‐
izational defensive routines, individual defensive routines,
self-monitoring behaviours, and engineering manager
behaviours are each relevant to the research question of
whether engineering managers exhibit defensive routines
more than non-engineering managers.
2.1 Organizational Defensive Routines
Defensive routines are defined as ‘any policies or actions
that prevent the organization from experiencing pain or
threat and simultaneously prevent learning how to correct
the causes of threat in the first place’ [7]. Organizational
defensive routines often become rooted in the organiza‐
tions, causing difficulty in the ability to change organiza‐
tional cultures. Organizational traditions are familiar and
can trigger resistance due to moving outside of organiza‐
tional norms. The most common defensive routine used in
organizations is the mixed message. Mixed messages are
messages that are designed to be inconsistent [7].
2.2 Individual Defensive Routines
Defensive routines are often used when one feels the need
to protect their integrity [8]. Some common defensive
routines are self-censoring, face saving, unilateral control,
bypass, mixed messages, protective support, and fancy
footwork. Self-censoring is a routine used to keep negative
thoughts to one’s self [9]. Face-saving is used when an
individual does not want to point out someone else’s
mistakes. This can be accomplished in several ways. One
2
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way is for someone to point out something negative about
himself or herself as opposed to the other person. Another
way to demonstrate face-saving is to disguise criticisms
through ambiguity. Unilateral control is another routine
that is used. This is performed by stating one’s opinion in
such a forceful way that the ability to question the validity
of that opinion is eliminated [9]. Bypass is a routine to avoid
dealing with threat. Bypass utilizes two methods. The first
method is to be direct and ‘tell it like it is’ [10]. The second
method is to ‘ease in’. This is a strategy used when indi‐
viduals want to appear passive when in actuality they are
active [10]. Mixed messages are used when one wants to
hide the true message [10]. Protective support is defined as
a method used to appear supportive of individuals but still
seeking control of the situation [9]. Fancy footwork is
defined as switching one’s viewpoint to defend his or her
position but to act as if the switch did not happen [9].
Argyris is the founder of ‘Action Science’. Action Science is
defined as a theory that explains individuals’ interactions
based on their espoused theories and theories-in-use [11].
Argyris and Schon [6] concluded that human action is
based on theories of action. The theory of action is defined
as the actual behaviour exhibited in a particular situation
[5]. Espoused theory is defined as the theory that the
individual wishes to execute, while theory-in-use is what
is actually used. More often than not, the espoused theory
is incongruent with the theory-in-use.
Argyris [12] states that Model I Theory-In-Use has four
governing values, which include (1) define unilaterally the
purpose of a situation, (2) maximize winning and not
losing, (3) suppress negative feelings, and (4) be rational.
The strategies that are often used with these governing
variables are to advocate one’s position to remain in control
and to save face. The consequences of these actions are
miscommunication, mistrust, protectiveness, self-fulfilling
prophecies, self-sealing processes, and escalating error [9].
Model II has three governing values including (1) valid
information, (2) free and informed choice, and (3) monitor
effectiveness of one’s actions [13]. The strategies that are
often used with these governing variables are to advocate
one’s position and combine inquiry and testing in order to
minimize face saving behaviour.
Defensive routines can inhibit ones learning, which is the
ability to detect and correct errors. Learning can also take
place when there is a match between one’s intent and what
actually happened [10]. There are two types of learning that
can take place: single loop and double loop. Single loop
learning corrects the problem, but does not address the
underlying issues. Double loop learning corrects the
problem by examining the underlying assumptions that
created the problem [14]. There is a plethora of literature
available on Action Science, defensive routines, and Model
I and Model II behaviours that will be discussed next.
2.3 Self-Monitoring
Self-monitoring is similar to Argyris’ espoused theory and
theory-in-use. Self-monitoring is defined as ‘the process in

which people manage their public impressions consistent
with the demands of the situation or from their own stance
[15]. Acute perception, discernment, and understanding of
social behaviours are all characteristics of self-monitoring
[16]. However, there is one key difference between selfmonitoring and theory-in-use. Self-monitoring implies that
the individuals are making an effort to modify their
behaviour; whereas with theory-in-use, the behaviour is
often times not realized and, therefore, not monitored.
Considerable research has been performed on self-moni‐
toring behaviours in an attempt to bring awareness to
individuals who may need improvement and the opportu‐
nity for correction.
Self-monitoring behaviour is divided into two categories:
high self-monitoring and low self-monitoring. High selfmonitors are individuals who focus on their social context,
are more responsive to social cues, and are very attentive
to the behaviours of others [17]. High self-monitors attempt
to impress others in order to win their approval and respect
[16] and focus on the perception of how they are viewed in
the image of others. Research has shown that high selfmonitors’ desire for social status can affect their decisionmaking [16]. High self-monitors are sensitive to situations,
can adjust their behaviours accordingly, and typically have
better communication skills.
Research shows that high self-monitors tend to perform
better in jobs, emerge as leaders, and are more likely to
solve problems through collaboration and compromise
rather than avoidance and competition [18]. These behav‐
iours are very similar to the governing variables in Model
II behaviour.
Low self-monitors are a contrast to high self-monitors. Low
self-monitors are not as sensitive and are less concerned
with their impact on others. Low self-monitors operate
according to their internal feelings instead of external
factors [18]. This implies that low self-monitors may be
more introverted, which is a common description of many
engineers.
The most common tool for evaluating self-monitoring
behaviour is the self-monitor scale. Mark Snyder devel‐
oped this tool in 1974 [19]. The self-monitor scale is a
multidimensional, complex scale that is composed of 25
items to be measured. In 1986, Lennox and Wolfe devel‐
oped a revised shortened version of the self-monitoring
scale. The shortened version focuses on items that are above
0.15 on the first un-rotated factor [19].
3. Engineering Managers
Considerable research has been conducted on engineering
managers regarding the type of characteristics and behav‐
iours that they should exhibit in order to be successful as
managers. Engineering managers must not only be techni‐
cally competent, but must also understand the business
aspects of organizations.

There has also been considerable research on engineers
and their behaviours, the majority of which supports that
engineering education has a direct effect on how
engineers operate in the working environment. Accord‐
ing to Wyrick [20], the way engineering is taught dictates
how engineers process information during his or her
career as well as how technical organizations develop
their cultures. Universities typically focus on the theoret‐
ical aspects of engineering versus preparing students for
real-world engineering [1]. In order for engineers to be
prepared for leadership and management, the training
should occur early in their careers, as early as during
undergraduate education [21].
Some believe that engineers move into management
because the technical path is truncated once a certain level
is received [3]. Roberts and Biddle [3] discuss the human
resource perspective of why engineers move into manage‐
ment. Human Resource departments in organizations often
believe that engineers move into management because the
upward mobility of technical professionals is limited.
Within the study, Roberts and Biddle ask a series of
questions on the transition to management regarding who
gets promoted, if technical workers make good managers,
if individuals return to the technical track once they leave,
and if the best technical workers leave because of limita‐
tions in upward mobility.
Research studies that focus on the learning styles needed
to be an effective team leader and engineering manager
have also been conducted [20]. Wyrick states that it is
important to understand how engineers process informa‐
tion in order to make them more effective [20]. The
research finds that engineers who take the Myers-Brigg
assessment typically rely on introversion, intuition,
thinking, and judging (INTJ). There is a belief that there
is a connection between the major personality traits.
Managers are expected to exhibit certain leadership styles
that appeal to their teams. To explore this relationship in
more detail, additional data can be collected from the
managers using a short behaviour survey such as the Big
Five. The Big Five survey measures factors of extraver‐
sion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and
openness to experience.
As discussed, there is literature that discusses defensive
routines, engineering manager behaviours, as well as
leadership and personality behaviours such as selfmonitoring. However, there is little literature that examines
how engineering managers exhibit defensive routines.
Engineering managers and defensive routines are studied
as separate entities. Therefore, there is a gap in the litera‐
ture. This study serves as a means to fill that gap by
examining whether engineering managers exhibit defen‐
sive routines more than non-engineering managers using
the following methodology.
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4. Methodology
4.1 Description of the hypothesis
The hypothesis of this study is whether engineering
managers exhibit defensive routines more than nonengineering managers.
This hypothesis was developed for several reasons. For
example, high pressure grading evaluations can contribute
because the student does not want to fail. Often schoolwork
consists of yes or no answers; this eliminates the ability to
manage ambiguity. Since the ambiguity is not there, there
is no reason to inquire. Model II behaviour is based on the
ability to inquire. These are all factors that are related to
defensive routines, and research exists that supports this
behaviour. With high pressure grading, there is work on
motivation that suggests that highly extrinsic motivation
drives people toward only wanting to solve simple,
unambiguous problems so they can get a reward, such as
a good grade [22]. Secondly, engineering managers are
more prone to product and process development as
opposed to visionary thinking. Third, engineering manag‐
ers often struggle with the acceptance of failures of system
implementation [23]. To test this hypothesis, a packet was
developed to distribute to the manager participants to
complete.
4.2 Participant Packet
Upon confirmation of their participation, the managers
were sent a copy of the participant packet. This packet was
comprised of an introduction letter from the researcher, a
consent form that was in alignment with the Institutional
Review Board’s (IRB) requirements to confirm anonymity,
a questionnaire to capture more demographic information
about the individuals, and the cases to complete. The
participants were given two weeks to complete the packet.
The survey data are used to capture background informa‐
tion about the managers and to examine any commonalities
and trends that might surface in the data. The survey asks
the following questions:

4

a.

What is your undergraduate degree in?

b.

Do you have an advanced degree(s)? If so, what is it
in?

c.

How many years of experience in management do you
have?

d.

How many total individuals do you manage?

e.

Do you manage engineers? If so, how many?

f.

Do you manage other managers? If so, how many?

g.

Have you received any in-house management and/or
non-credited management training? If so, please
describe briefly.

h.

What is your age?

Int J Eng Bus Manag, 2015, 7:8 | doi: 10.5772/60114

This research examines the results of a situation that the
manager may have encountered with their manager,
employee, or colleague. The case follows the structure of
case studies from Argyris [24]. The case begins with the
description of the problem as follows: describe a situation
or problem that you have experienced in your time as a
manager. The situation can be recurring or a onetime
occurrence with your subordinates, peers, or manager.
Who are the important people involved and what is your
relationship to them? Feel free to use generic names (i.e.,
‘Employee A’, ‘John Doe’). The case proceeds in the
following format:
a.

Cause of the problem - What do you think happened
to cause the problem? Who or what is primarily
responsible for the problem? (If someone or something
is).

b.

Goals - Describe the goals/objectives of the people
involved. How certain of this are you?

c.

Strategy - Describe what your strategy would be for
obtaining these goals. Please be as specific as possible.

d.

Scenario - This section is where the dialogue is
captured using the Left Hand Column approach. On
the left side of the paper, the managers are to write
down their private thoughts and feelings, while
writing what was actually said on the right hand side
of the paper.

4.3 Participant Demographics
The participants of this study were all managers who were
known to the researcher. These managers were selected
because the assumption is they would be truthful in their
responses to the case studies and be without fear of
retaliation from their employer. The managers represent a
diverse cross section of industries. The participants were
contacted via email or phone call from the researcher
requesting their assistance. The managers were requested
to reach out to additional potential research participants.
The engineering managers are classified as managers who
have an educational background in engineering disciplines
such as but not limited to electrical, mechanical, civil,
aerospace, etc. The non-engineering managers are manag‐
ers who have undergraduate degrees in areas such as
finance, human resources, business, etc. However, there
was a third category of managers that was considered.
These are managers that do not have degrees in engineer‐
ing, but they do have specific backgrounds in those two
categories such as physics, mathematics, or computer
science. As such they were analysed separately. For the
study, 55 managers were contacted to participate, 41
managers confirmed their participation, and 27 packets
were received. This yields a response rate of 49%. This
study uses a small sample size in order to decrease the
ability to draw broad conclusions. The scoring methodol‐
ogy was developed in order to measure the responses of
the managers.

4.4 Scoring Packet
This section describes the scoring packet that was devel‐
oped by the researcher to obtain quantitative measures. The
scorer packet was provided to the scorers to score the
completed packets. The packet contained an introduction
from the researcher, categories to be scored, instructions on
how to code the paragraphs, behaviour tally sheets, and an
example of a case that was already scored. The data were
scored based on the scoring method developed by Marasi‐
gan-Sotto [25] to determine whether an individual is
operating under Model I or Model II behaviour. The
process of scoring the packets was outlined in the scoring
rubric for the scorers’ reference. The packets were coded
using roman numerals, capital letters, and numbers. The
approach was to count the behaviours that were used. The
two top categories were Model I Theory-In-Use and Model
II Theory-In-Use. There are sub-categories that fall under
Model I and Model II. The choices for Model I Theory-InUse were bypass, face-saving, fancy footwork, mixed
message, protective support, self-censoring, un-illustrated
evaluation, un-illustrated inquiry, un-illustrated attribu‐
tion, and unilateral control. The categories for Model II
were advocacy, attribution, evaluation, inquiry, and
testing. However, there were some enhancements made to
the scoring categories to account for additional defensive
routines. The scoring packet was enhanced to add the
following categories: bypass, face-saving, fancy footwork,
mixed message, protective support, self-censoring, and
unilateral control.
The public dialogue section was the portion of the packet
that was scored for the defensive routines. This section
outlines the conversation that took place between the
manager and the employee. Only the dialogue of the
managers was scored. The dialogue of the employee was
not scored because there was not enough background on
the employee to make an accurate decision on which
behaviour was being exhibited. Each line of the manager’s
dialogue was assessed against the defensive routine
categories in the packet to determine which behaviour was
exhibited and was recorded on the behaviour tally sheet.
The sum of the Model I and Model II categories was then
determined. The behaviour that had the most marks
according to the behaviour tally sheet was the behaviour
that was captured for that manager. To address the biasing
in the scoring and determine inter-rater reliability, two
additional scorers were recruited to score along with the
researcher. The scorers were comprised of one graduate
student and one undergraduate student, who both have
about the same level of knowledge as one another regard‐
ing defensive routines. Inter-rater reliability is defined as
the extent to which information being collected is collected
consistently [26]. It focuses on ensuring that there is a
certain level of agreement among those examining the data.
The typical level of agreement is 0.7 [27].

There are some methods and best practices that can be
employed to improve inter-rater reliability. The key
measuring factor is the rater. Raters who are familiar with
the constructs should be chosen and thoroughly trained in
scoring and coding the data. Another best practice is to
ensure that the raters understand the coding procedures
[26]. Inter-rater reliability will be discussed in a subsequent
section.
The scorers were provided with a two and a half hour
training session with the researcher in which the scoring
packet was reviewed in detail. The two additional scorers
were not familiar with this type of data analysis. During
this training session, the researcher reviewed the scorer
packet with emphasis on the definitions and the types of
categories that would be scored with the additional scorers.
After reading through this information, the first case study
response was scored together to ensure consistency in the
scoring methods. The scorers agreed on this packet.
After the training session, the scorers were provided with
copies of the case study as well as copies of the behaviour
tally sheets to complete their scoring. The scorers were
given a week to complete their scoring. During this week,
there was a conference call with the scorers and researcher
to review an additional case to ensure consistency, as well
as answer any questions that the scorers may have had. At
that time, the group scored packets 2 and 3 of the case study,
and there was 100% agreement.
After gaining a clearer perspective of inter-rater reliability
and reviewing additional literature, the initial approach of
using percentage agreement was determined to not be the
best approach. Percentage agreements do not take into
account chance agreements, since chance is likely to inflate
the agreement [28]. The key differences in the coding
results stem from how each dialogue line was coded.
Because the results were obtained from a count, there was
no margin to account for those managers that fell on the
borderline of Model I and Model II. To increase inter-rater
reliability and reduce the level of chance agreement, the
scorers met again to re-score the cases that were on the
borderline between Model I and Model II to ensure that
there is a common level of understanding of the data.
Initially, the scorers scored the data separately. The scorers
were provided with additional literature to review regard‐
ing defensive routines to supplement the scoring packet.
The goal of scoring the cases together is to encourage open
dialogue as to how the results were reached. Table 4 shows
the final scores of the behaviours according to each scorer
after meeting again.
Once the case studies were scored completely, the interrater reliability was calculated. The inter-rater reliability
was calculated as shown in Equation 1:
Inter-rater Reliability =

Number of Packet Agreements
´ 100
Number of Packets Scored

(1)
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4.5 Scoring Categories
This section outlines the scoring categories that were being
measured. Below are categories that define the most
common defensive routines. Under each category is an
example of a type of tactic that might be used in the
particular routine. The common cues can be described with
key indicators or through certain types of examples. Some
of the defensive routines are identified based on the
perception of the reader.
5. Results
This section discusses the results of the case study and the
demographics of the participants. This section also pro‐
vides a summary of the responses to the questionnaire data
to provide an overview of the type of managers that
participated in the case study.
The first step was to determine how many respondents
were engineering managers, non-engineering managers, or
other. Engineering managers were defined as managers
who had completed the requirements for a Bachelors
degree in an engineering field such as electrical, mechani‐
cal, industrial, etc., while non-engineering managers were
classified as those not holding an engineering degree. A
third group called ‘other’ was developed for those manag‐
ers who completed degrees in technical and scientific areas
such as computer science, physics, information technology,
mathematics, and others. Therefore, 17 of the managers
managed other engineers, while ten of the managers did
not.
5.1 Demographic Analysis
Table 1 shows a tabular view of the information received
from the questionnaires. The number in parentheses
represents the corresponding number of managers. The
data from the questionnaire were analysed to determine if
there were any patterns based on the various generations.
Of the 27 packets submitted ten were male managers and
17 were female.
The age of the managers ranged from 26-62 years old as
shown in Table 1. The average age was 44 years old. The
median age was 45 years old and the standard deviation
was 9.81. The 27 participants were categorized as Baby
Boomers, Generation X, and Generation Y. The Baby
Boomers are the managers that were born between 1946
and 1963 and the Generation X managers are those that
were born between 1964 and 1980. The Generation Y
managers, also known as millennials, are all those born
after 1980.
After grouping, there were a total of 11 managers that
would be classified as Baby Boomers, 15 managers classi‐
fied as Generation X, and one manager classified as
Generation Y (Table 1). For the Baby Boomers, there were
seven that operated with a Model I Theory-In-Use and
three that operated with a Model II Theory-In-Use. Model
6

Int J Eng Bus Manag, 2015, 7:8 | doi: 10.5772/60114

II Theory-In-Use behaviour was only shown in the NonEngineering or the ‘Other’ categories. All of the engineering
managers in this generation operated in Model I TheoryIn-Use. For the Generation X managers, there were 11
managers that operated in Model I Theory-In-Use behav‐
iour and four that operated in Model II Theory-In-Use
behaviour. Of the five engineering managers, four operated
in Model I Theory-In-Use and one operated in Model II
Theory-In-Use. For the Generation Y manager, this man‐
ager operated in Model I Theory-In-Use. Based on the
information from the case study, this manager spent a lot
of the dialogue trying to assert themselves to prove
themselves worthy of being a manager.
The managers were asked about their educational back‐
grounds. The highest percentage of undergraduate degrees
was in business at 26% and the highest number of graduate
degrees was the Masters of Business Administration degree
at 33%. There were three managers who were awarded
PhDs in Nuclear Physics, English, and Organizational
Leadership. A statistical analysis was performed on these
data as well. The average number of years of management
experience that the managers had was 13.85 years. The
lowest number of years of management experience was one
year. The highest number of years of management experi‐
ence was 30 years. The median number of years of man‐
agement experience was 14. The standard deviation of
years of management experience was 9.00.
There was a large range in the number of individuals that
the managers manage. This is due to the managers being at
different levels of leadership within their respective
organizations.
Additional statistical analysis was performed on the
number of individuals actually managed by the managers.
The average number of individuals managed is 27. The
smallest number of individuals that the managers super‐
vise is 0. The maximum number of individuals that the
managers supervise is 250. The median number of individ‐
uals that the managers supervise is 12. The standard
deviation of the number of individuals that the managers
supervise is 48.06.
Those managers who managed engineers were asked for
the number of engineers that they managed. Again,
depending on the level of leadership and the type of
organization, this number could vary. In addition, a
statistical analysis was performed on the responses to this
question. The average number of engineers that the
participants manage is 15. The lowest number of engineers
that the participants manage is 0. The maximum number of
individuals that the participants manage is 250. This
particular manager is a high-level manager, whereby they
may have counted their entire organization. The median
number of engineers that the participants manage is two.
The standard deviation of the number of engineers that the
managers manage is 48.

Depending on the level of leadership, there is a possibility
that the managers could also manage other managers.
Therefore, this question was asked. Eleven of the partici‐
pants supervise other managers, while 16 participants do
not supervise other managers; therefore, 41% of the
participants supervise other managers. Additional statisti‐
cal analyses were performed on the number of participants
that are managed by the managers who participated in the
study. According to the data received, the average number
of participants that the managers manage is 5.40. The
lowest number of participants that the managers supervise
is 0. The maximum number of managers that the partici‐
pants supervise is 45. The median number of managers that
the participants supervise is 0. The standard deviation of
the number of managers that the participants supervise is
11.89.
To gain an understanding of how the managers were
prepared for their position as a manager, they were asked
about the training they received both within their organi‐
zations and external to their organizations. There was a
plethora of training that was reported from the managers,
which was broken into three groups. The first is the training
reported by those who are classified as engineering
managers, and which is depicted in Table 2. The second
group of training is that reported by non-engineering
managers, as shown in Table 3. Finally, the third group of
training reported is training from those who do not fall into
the engineering manager group or the non-engineering
manager group. They have been depicted as others and are
shown in Table 4.
5.2 Case Study Response Overview
This section provides an overview of the qualitative
responses that were required in the case study. The
participants were given the following instructions: describe
a situation or problem that you have experienced in your
time as a manager. It can be a recurring situation or a
onetime occurrence with your subordinates, peers, or
manager. Who are the important people involved and what
is your relationship to them? Feel free to use generic names

Engineers

Managers

Undergraduate

Managed

Managed

Degrees

0-9 years, (9)

0-24, (18)

0-9, (20)

0-9, (22)

Biology, (1)

Accounting, (1)

Generation X, (15)

10-19 years, (9)

25-49, (6)

10-19, (3)

10-19, (2)

Business, (7)

Business Administration, (10)

Generation Y, (1)

20-29 years, (7)

50-74, (1)

20-29, (1)

20-29, (1)

30+ years, (2)

75+, (2)

30+, (3)

30+, (2)

Baby Boomers,
(11)

56-65 years,
(4)

A tabular view of the managers and how their behaviour
was classified is shown in Table 5. Eight of the engineering
managers operated in Model I Theory-In-Use, five nonengineering managers operated in Model I Theory-In-Use,
and six of the managers classified as ‘other’ operated in
Model I Theory-In-Use. Only one engineering manager
operated in Model II, three non-engineering managers
operated in Model II Theory-In-Use, and three of the other
managers operated in Model II Theory-In-Use.

Managed

(8)

(7)

The managers were asked what their strategy would be for
obtaining the goals that were listed in the previous section.
Strategies included face-to-face meetings with employees,
additional training, maintaining a level of transparency to
their teams, compiling feedback, listening more, involving
human resources, and redistributing workloads.

Individuals

26-35 years,

46-55 years,

The managers were asked to describe the goals/objectives
of the people involved and inquired how certain they were
of this. The common themes in the responses were that the
goal of the manager is to get the job done, delegate tasks,
and find out what the problem is. Many of the managers
had a goal to have a successful team and a smoothly
running organization.

Years of

Generation

(7)

The managers were asked what they thought was the cause
of the problem and who or what is primarily responsible
for causing the problem. There was a range of responses to
answer this question. Many managers made comments
regarding employees not familiar with job duties stemming
from not being adequately trained or transitioned. The
managers who experienced insubordination believed the
cause was due to company cultures and faulty organization
reporting.

Management

Age

36-45 years,

(i.e., ‘Employee A’, ‘John Doe’). Again, this case study is
open-ended and a variety of situations were discussed.
There was some overlap, as several managers were
experiencing similar situations with employees such as
underperformance, undervalue of management, personal
problems affecting work performance, insubordination,
working with other employees, and training colleagues.

Advanced Degrees

Computer Science, (3) Engineering Management, (3)
Electrical Engineering,
(5)

Did not

General Engineering,

respond (1)

(1)

English, (1)

Industrial Hygiene, (1)
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Age

Generation

Years of

Individuals

Engineers

Managers

Undergraduate

Management

Managed

Managed

Managed

Degrees
Industrial Engineering,
(3)
Marketing, (1)

Advanced Degrees

Information Management, (1)
Management Information
Systems, (1)

Mathematics, (3)

None, (8)

Mechanical

Physics, (1)

Engineering, (1)
Management
Information Systems,

Telecommunications

(1)

Management, (1)

Physics, (1)
Table 1. This table shows a summary of the demographics of the manager participants.

Engineering Managers
Management within the Law

Team Basics

Objectives and Deadlines

Company Policy

Communication

Excelling as a Manager or Supervisor

Conflict Resolution

Legal Issues for Managers

Transition to Management

Project Management

General Leadership

Leadership Development

First Line Leadership

Coping with Difficult People

ATT Leadership Training

Managing from the Middle

Myers-Briggs

GE Leadership Training at Crotonville

Delegating

Invest in your Career

Senior Leadership Training

Coaching Others

Earned Value Management Systems

Executive Programme I

Setting Expectations

Value Engineering

Executive Programme II

Time Management

Essentials of Communicating with Diplomacy and
Professionalism

Executive Programme III

Managing Multiple Projects
Table 2. The training completed by the engineering managers.

Non-Engineering Managers
Lean Six Sigma Greenbelt

Healthcare Management and Administration

Middle Management Training

Sexual Harassment

General Management Training

Crucial Conversation

Human Resources

Infantry Officer Basic Course

Connections Training

Infantry Officer Advanced Course

Workplace Violence

Combined Arms and Services Staff School

Harassment Policy Training

Command and General Staff College

Information Sharing

Introduction to Management

Management Development 12-week Programme

Speaking and Presentation Skills

Table 3. The training completed by the non-engineering managers.
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Others
Well-managed Health Care OrganizationsSenior Leadership Training
Ethics

Executive Programme I

Human Resources

Executive Programme II

Governance

Executive Programme III

Project Management

Transition to Management

Conflict and Acquisition Training

Management Development

Conflict Management

University Executive Programme

Table 4. The training completed by the managers classified as ‘Other’.

6. Conclusion
An understanding of how engineering managers behave
when put in certain situations can be beneficial to an
organization. This information can allow organizations to
develop training and coaching methods to reduce unde‐
sired behaviours in their managers. The purpose of this
research was to use the scoring method to determine
whether engineering managers exhibit defensive routines
more than non-engineering managers.
Based on the results of the scoring, defensive routines are
more prevalent in engineering managers. As shown in
Table 5, eight of the nine engineering managers operated
in Model I Theory-In-Use, which was the highest of all the
manager groups. Scorer 1 and Scorer 2 had an overall
80.77% scoring agreement among the scored cases. Scorer
1 and Scorer 3 had an overall 88.46% scoring agreement.
Scorer 2 and Scorer 3 had 84.62% scoring agreement. The
total average of scorer agreement is 84.62%. This is shown
in the percentage agreement in Table 5. Because there was
only the choice between Model I and Model II behaviour,
there was either 0% agreement or 100% agreement.
In revisiting the original hypotheses, we would fail to reject
hypothesis 1: that engineering managers exhibit defensive
routines more than non-engineering managers. We would
fail to reject this hypothesis because according to the
results, engineering managers illustrated more defensive
routines than non-engineering managers.
Engineering

Non-Engineering

Managers

Managers

Model I

8

5

6

Model II

1

3

3

Others

Table 5. Managers' behaviour classification based on Model I and Model II.

7. Future Work
To date there has not been a comparison study of engineer‐
ing managers against other types of managers based on
defensive routines. The study is important to the engineer‐
ing management profession because awareness is brought
to organizations, enabling them to be more proficient at
ensuring their leadership is effectively leading and moti‐

vating their team. This research used methods to determine
if there was a difference in the usage of defensive routines
between engineering managers and non-engineering
managers, and the data show that there is. This opens the
door to several areas of future work.
Intervention methods could be developed specifically for
engineering managers to help bring awareness to their
behaviours and how to improve upon them. In addition, a
training curriculum could be developed for organizations
and universities to bring awareness to this area as well. The
literature illustrates that there is a clear gap in the training
of engineering students that prepares them for entry into
organizational environments. There could be more re‐
search performed to analyse the personality traits of the
managers.
As mentioned in a previous section, the Big Five Survey is
an instrument that could be used to capture these data. In
order to collect these data at a later time, a plan would need
to be put into place. The biggest challenge would be for the
managers to find time to complete the survey. The ap‐
proach would be to develop a link and send to the managers
who completed the case studies to obtain the additional
information on their personality traits. Lastly, because this
was a qualitative study, statistical analysis was not con‐
ducted on the dialogues of the case studies. Therefore,
future work could develop statistical tools to further
validate the scoring method used.
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